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For mechanism design with independent values, we identify a subclass of Vickrey–
Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanisms that induce eﬃcient ex ante investments even
with externalities. The Vickrey second price auction does not belong to this class.
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11 Introduction
For mechanism design with independent values, we identify a subclass of Vickrey–Clarke–
Groves (VCG) mechanisms that induce eﬃcient ex ante investments when investments
exhibit externalities. Hence, we extend the result that there is no trade–oﬀ between
ex ante eﬃciency and ex post eﬃcient implementation in the independent private value
setting (e.g. Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki 2002, Arozamena and Cantillon 2004). Yet, in
contrast to the case without externalities not every VCG induces eﬃcient ex ante invest-
ments. In particular, the familiar Vickrey second price auction does not induce eﬃcient
investments and therefore does not belong to the identiﬁed subclass of VCG mechansims.
Spectral auctions for mobile phones, where entrants beneﬁt indirectly from an incumbent’s
investment in ﬁxed–line telephone connections, are typical examples of an implementation
setting that exhibits ex ante investments with externalities.
2 Setup
There are n players i = 1,...,n, a social planner, a set X of possible decisions, and for
each player i a set of types Si = [si,si] ⊆ R. Let S = ×iSi. There are two periods. In
period 1, each player i independently and simultaneously chooses an investment αi ≥ 0
at a personal cost ci(αi). After the players have chosen their investment levels their
types s ∈ S are realized. In particular, player i’s type si is the realization of a random
variable ˜ si with cdf Fi(si;α). Since the distribution may depend on the entire investment
proﬁle α = (α1,...,αn), our setup allows for investment externalities. We assume that the
family (˜ s1,..., ˜ sn) is stochastically independent for all α so that we consider a framework
of independent, private values. Moreover, we assume that ˜ si has a pdf fi(si;α) that is
bounded, strictly positive, and diﬀerentiable in α for all si and α.
In period 2, a decision x ∈ X is implemented together with a transfer schedule t =
(t1,...,tn) specifying a transfer ti of agent i to the social planner. We assume that agents
have quasi–linear utility functions that are additively separable in decision, transfer, and
cost. That is, given an investment proﬁle α, a type realization s, a decision x, and a
2transfer ti, agent i receives a utility
ui(α,s,x,t) = vi(x,si) − ti − ci(αi).





















We call a decision rule x : S → X ex post eﬃcient if x∗(s) satisﬁes (1) for every s ∈ S.
Agent i’s expected utility from an investment proﬁle α and an ex post eﬃcient decision
rule x∗(s) is
Ui(α) = E [vi(x
∗(˜ s), ˜ si)] − ci(αi). (2)
An ex ante investment proﬁle α∗ = (α∗
1,...,α∗
n) is ex ante eﬃcient with respect to
an ex post eﬃcient decision rule x∗(s) if and only if it maximizes the expected sum of
utilities U(α) =
P




A combination (α∗,x∗(s)) satisfying (1) and (3) is overall eﬃcient.
















We assume that the ex ante eﬃcient level α∗ is interior and therefore satisﬁes the ﬁrst
and second order conditions. Hence, ∂U(α∗)/∂αi = 0 for all i = 1,...,n.
34 Private Information
Now assume the players’ types are private information. In this case the implementation
of an ex post eﬃcient decision rule requires the transmission of private information. We
suppose that the social planner may employ some mechanism to elicit such information.
Due to the revelation principle, we may restrict attention to direct mechanisms (x,t) :
S → X×Rn that require each player to independently submit a report ˆ si ∈ Si and selects
allocation (x(ˆ s),t(ˆ s)) conditional on the joint reports ˆ s = (ˆ s1,..., ˆ sn). The mechanism
(x,t) implements the decision rule ξ : S → X in dominant strategies if ξ = x and
truthtelling is a dominant strategy for each player. We are interested in mechanisms that
implement an ex post eﬃcient rule x∗(s) and induce an ex ante eﬃcient investment proﬁle
α∗. It is well known that x∗(s) is implemented in dominant strategies by a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism (x,t) (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, p.271ﬀ). These direct
mechanisms are characterized by
x(s) = x





where hi is an arbitrary function that depends only on the proﬁle s−i of types excluding
si.
We assume that players play a Nash equilibrium in period 1 thereby anticipating that a
VCG mechanism is used in period 2. Given an investment proﬁle α and a type realization
s ∈ S, a VCG mechanism yields player i a utility of
ui (s,αi;α−i) = vi (x





∗ (s),sj) + hi (s−i) − ci (αi).
Thus, in period 1 player i’s expected utility is Ui (αi;α−i) = E [ui (˜ s,αi;α−i)], and player
















E [hi (˜ s−i)] − c
0
i (αi). (5)




E [hi (˜ s−i)].
We refer to δi (αi;α−i) as player i’s excess investment incentive, because if
δi (α
∗) = 0, (6)
then the private incentive to invest (5) coincides with the social contribution of investment
(4). In this case, the ﬁrst order necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium ∂Ui(α)/∂αi =
0 have a solution at α∗. As a result, the VCG mechanism induces eﬃcient investments
α∗ as an equilibrium. We call a VCG mechanism with (6) investment eﬃcient.
Due to independence, the pdf of the multivariate random variable ˜ s−i is f−i(s−i;α) =
Q





























Proposition 1 A VCG mechanism is investment eﬃcient if
(i) ∂
∂αif−i (s−i;α) = 0 for all α, or
(ii) hi is a constant.




















= 0 for all α. 
Condition (i) says that player j’s investment has no eﬀect on player i’s type distribu-
tion and describes the case without investment externalities. Thus, in the absence of
externalities, any VCG mechanism is investment eﬃcient. This is the observation made
in Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2002), Theorem 1.
5Condition (ii) says that even in the presence of externalities, ex ante eﬃciency can
be achieved by simply setting hi equal to a constant. By the appropriate choice of the
constants hi, any division of the ex ante surplus among the players can be achieved. In
particular, the social planner can achieve an ex ante balanced budget, i.e. the sum of ex-
pected transfers to the planner is 0. Note that there are other, non-constant functions hi
that satisfy (6), but these depend on the speciﬁcs of the densities fi. Hence, following the
Wilson doctrine of “detail–free” implementation (e.g. Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000) condi-
tion (ii) deﬁnes a subclass of VCG mechanisms with the advantage of being independent
of any distributional details.
The signiﬁcance of Proposition 1 is partially owed to a prominent VCG mechanism,
the second price auction, which is not ex ante eﬃcient. This is illustrated in the following
example.
5 Vickrey auction is not ex ante eﬃcient
There are two players and a single object. Let X = {x1,x2}, where xi means that player
i gets the object. Let Si = [0,1] and interpret si as player i’s valuation of the object.
Suppose only player 1 can invest. Let α1 ∈ [0,1] and consider
F1 (s1;α1) = s
α1
1 ,
F2 (s2;α1) = s
k+γα1
2 ,
where k > 0 and γ are constants such that k + γα1 ≥ 0. That is, player 1’s investment
decreases (γ < 0) or increases (γ > 0) player 2’s valuation in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance. In other words, there is a negative or positive spillover from player
1 to player 2.
Recall that the Vickrey auction is a speciﬁc VCG with
hi (s−i) = −s−i.
Hence, player 1’s private excess incentive is
δ1 (α1) =
−γ
(k + γα1 + 1)
2.
6Therefore, δ1 (α1) ≤ 0 ⇔ γ ≥ 0, and we conclude that there is too much (little) equilib-
rium investment when there is a negative (positive) spillover.
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